The United Nations and Disarmament since 1945

United Nations

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INTRODUCTION

The founding of the United Nations at San Francisco, during the final months of the Second World War, in the summer of 1945, symbolized the beginning of a new era in international relations. The Charter of the United Nations embodied principles and provided a forum to discourage war as an instrument of policy between nations. The first of those principles was the commitment to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". Moreover, within the framework of the Charter, the world Organization offered opportunities for Member States to develop new forums, methods and international machinery of cooperation for international peace and security. To help achieve that goal, the Charter entrusted the General Assembly and the Security Council with the responsibility for dealing with questions of arms limitation and disarmament.

Only days after the signing of the Charter, the world entered into a dramatic new era—the nuclear age—which, as it turned out, gave a completely new dimension to all human endeavours. The newly formed United Nations was thus confronted with unprecedented military and political problems. The Charter had envisaged arms limitation and disarmament as elements in the progressive establishment of an international security system. However, the revolutionary changes brought about by the discovery of nuclear energy gave significant additional emphasis to disarmament in international politics and security.

A few months after the first atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United Nations General Assembly adopted its first resolution: it was on

disarmament, and specifically on the establishment of a commission—the Atomic Energy Commission—whose terms of reference were designed to ensure the elimination of atomic and all other weapons of mass destruction and the use of atomic energy only for peaceful purposes. The General Assembly also underlined, later that year in resolution 41(I), the connection between the questions of disarmament and of peace and security.

Since that time, the United Nations has, over the years, dealt with disarmament questions using a variety of bodies, methods, techniques and approaches. The problems involved are complex and are often seen to affect the vital security interests of States. The political compromises necessary to solve them have therefore often been difficult to reach, and the results achieved have often been characterized as modest.

In recent years the General Assembly, its First Committee and the Disarmament Commission have been the main United Nations deliberative bodies in the field of disarmament. The General Assembly sometimes also establishes ad hoc committees to deal with specific disarmament matters. In addition, since 1962 a multilateral disarmament negotiating forum with a limited membership—now known as the Conference on Disarmament—has been in place in Geneva. It has a unique relationship with the United Nations: while it defines its own rules of procedure and develops its own agenda, it takes into account the recommendations made by the General Assembly and reports to the Assembly annually or, as appropriate, more frequently.

CHANGING APPROACHES TO DISARMAMENT

The needs and the basic objectives of disarmament have remained constant through the years, but the approach to the subject and the scope of negotiations have changed, as a reflection of varying political realities and international conditions. The technical problems related to disarmament have also changed along with the rapid technological and scientific advances that have been made.

At the outset, the scope of negotiations was very broad. The Atomic Energy Commission and another body—the Commission for Conventional Armaments (established in 1947)—envisaged immediate plans to ensure that atomic energy would be used only for peaceful purposes and that all armaments and armed forces would be regulated and reduced under an international system of control and inspection. In fact, up until the early 1950s the objective was the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction by stages of all armed forces and armaments in a coordinated, comprehensive programme.

With little progress towards agreement on a coordinated, comprehensive programme, more impetus was given in the late 1950s to a "partial approach". It was hoped that the achievement of some first, though limited, steps would increase confidence and create a more favourable atmosphere for comprehensive agreements.

Although in 1959 the General Assembly stressed general and complete disarmament under effective international control as a goal to be actively sought,

partial disarmament measures continued to be pursued as well. It was felt that devoting parallel and, at times, even primary attention to "collateral" measures—designed to reduce tension and build confidence—would facilitate the complex task of achieving general and complete disarmament. The immediate hopes and expectations of the great majority of nations centred on two such measures—the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.

By the mid-1960s it became widely accepted, however, that general and complete disarmament was not an attainable goal in any short or specific period. For the next fifteen years, the tendency was, therefore, to regard general disarmament as the ultimate goal and to concentrate increasingly on partial objectives.

In terms of concrete multilateral achievements, the period of 1963 to 1978 was productive. Nevertheless, the measures achieved, although significant, were not adequate to curb the arms race or to alleviate the nuclear threat. They proscribed certain particularly undesirable developments, but did not in most cases result in substantial reductions of any of the major weapons systems. For a brief description of the process involved in concluding a treaty and a list of agreements reached, see annex I, page 17.

In reaction to what they called inadequate progress on those central issues, non-aligned States took an initiative that led to the convening of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978. That session adopted a Final Document setting out agreed goals, principles and priorities in arms limitation and disarmament. It stressed that the United

Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the field and specified measures intended to strengthen the international and multilateral machinery that deals with disarmament issues within the United Nations system. Subsequently, the Assembly convened two more special sessions, in 1982 and 1988. At neither session was it possible to reach agreement on a final document although, in the case of the 1988 session, tensions between East and West had begun to diminish.

In the 1990s, with the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and profound political changes in Eastern Europe, more than forty years of ideological and military competition between East and West came to an end. This has created unprecedented opportunities for progress in disarmament, as evidenced by reductions under way in the nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States, by certain unilateral measures undertaken by other nuclear-weapon States, and by conclusion of a ban on chemical weapons.

The end of the cold war has been marked, however, by potential regional arms races and the accumulation of ever more destructive weaponry by a growing number of countries. Regional instabilities, the emergence of ethnic and religious tensions and the continuing and heightened risk of proliferation of both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons have created serious challenges and rendered disarmament, now more than ever before, an urgent and necessary element of the system of international peace and security.

DISARMAMENT IN THE 1990s

In his report entitled *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post–Cold War Era*, the Secretary-General set forth his vision of the new opportunities and challenges of the 1990s. He saw the following issues as being of primary importance.

Integration: disarmament in the new international environment. "There is ... a constructive parallel between conflict resolution and disarmament: the two go hand in hand."

Globalization: enhancing the multilateral approach. "The goal is to extend disarmament efforts to include not only bilateral agreements but also multilateral arrangements in a world-wide process involving all States."

Revitalization: building on past achievements. Four areas of endeavour stand out: weapons of mass destruction, proliferation control, arms transfers, and transparency in arms and other confidence-building measures.

Some of the main events in the field of arms limitation and disarmament that have occurred in the first half of the decade are noted below. In the case of treaties, a brief description is given in the annex, see page 17.

Chronology 1990-1995

1990

20 August–14 September. The Fourth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty ends without agreement on a final declaration.

17 November. A new set of confidence- and security-building measures is adopted in Vienna by the 34 States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

19 November. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is signed in Paris by 22 States.

1991

8–17 January. The Amendment Conference of the States parties to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty is convened in New York, upon the request of more than one third of the parties, in an effort to advance prospects for conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

3 April. The Security Council adopts resolution 687 (1991), under which a Special Commission is established to carry out on-site inspection of and the destruction or rendering harmless of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is requested to carry out similar action with respect to Iraq's nuclear capabilities.

1 July. The members of the Warsaw Treaty agree to terminate the validity of the Treaty.

31 July. The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) is signed in Moscow by the USSR and the United States.

9–27 September. The Third Review Conference of the parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, meeting in Geneva, expresses its determination to strengthen the Convention. It further develops a set of

confidence-building measures and agrees to examine potential verification measures.

9 December. The General Assembly adopts resolution 46/36 L, "Transparency in armaments", by which it establishes the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Member States are called upon to provide relevant data and information on imports and exports of arms in seven categories of major conventional weapons systems and are invited to provide information on their national holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies.

1992

31 January. The Security Council meets for the first time at the level of heads of State and Government. The President makes a statement on behalf of the members in which they reaffirm the crucial contribution which progress in the fields of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation can make to the maintenance of international peace and security and in which they declare that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

23 May. The Lisbon Protocol to START I is signed in Lisbon by four successor States to the former USSR—Belarus, Kazakstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine—and by the United States.

17 June. The Secretary-General issues his report "An Agenda for Peace", in which he addresses the role of the United Nations in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping.

14–18 September. The Second Review Conference of the parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention) meets in Geneva and adopt by consensus a Final Declaration.

27 October. The Secretary-General issues his report "New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post–Cold War Era".

1993

3 January. The second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) is signed in Moscow by the Russian Federation and the United States.

13–15 January. The Chemical Weapons Convention is signed in Paris by 130 States.

10 August. The Conference on Disarmament decides to undertake negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, beginning in 1994.

16 December. The General Assembly adopts without a vote resolution 48/75 L, by which it recommends the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

1994

25 January. The Conference on Disarmament begins negotiation of a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

19–30 September. The Special Conference of the parties to the Biological Weapons Convention meeting in

Geneva underlines the need for a gradual approach towards establishing a regime to enhance the effectiveness of, and improve compliance with, the Convention and takes action to consider measures, including possible verification measures, to strengthen the Convention.

September. A Non-Aggression Pact between Central African States is initialled by a majority of those States in Yaoundé, Cameroon.

1995

5–6 April. The five nuclear-weapon States issue unilateral declarations in which they affirm that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (in the case of France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) and to parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any comparable internationally binding commitment (in the case of China).

11 April. The Security Council adopts resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in which it recognizes that the Council will act immediately in the event that such a State is the victim of an act or object of a threat of aggression involving nuclear weapons.

17 April–12 May. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the 178 parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty meets in New York to review the operation of the Treaty and to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. The Conference does not agree on a final declaration with respect to the

operation of the Treaty, but it adopts without a vote three documents: (*a*) "Strengthening the review process for the Treaty"; (*b*) "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" (the text of which is reproduced in annex II, page 27); and (*c*) a decision on extension, to the effect that the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely. In addition, it adopts a resolution on the Middle East.

24–28 June. The heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity adopt the text of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). Later, in December, the General Assembly of the United Nations welcomes the adoption of the Treaty.

23 September–13 October. The Review Conference of the parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons meets in Vienna to consider ways in which to strengthen the Convention. It adopts a new protocol (Protocol IV), regulating blinding laser weapons. It also considers how to strengthen the prohibition against land-mines (Protocol II).

15 December. The Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty is initialled in Bangkok, Thailand, at a summit meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Looking ahead

It is clear, at this mid-way point in the decade of the 1990s, that there is great potential in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. At the same time, there can be no room for complacency. Ways must be found to consolidate progress and to sustain the momentum in a systematic way. At the same time, it is becoming

increasingly evident that disarmament cannot be pursued in isolation from broader concerns of international security and that these broader concerns are themselves inextricably linked to economic and social issues.

The decisions taken at the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference have laid the foundation for progress in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament to be evaluated against a set of agreed principles and objectives. Among them are: universal adherence to the Treaty, early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. It is hoped that the regional nuclear measures now covering a large part of the globe—Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Africa and Southeast Asia—will be brought into effect where that is not yet the case and implemented as expeditiously as possible.

Two other achievements pertaining to weapons of mass destruction await further action by the international community before their benefits can be fully realized: conclusion of provisions to verify compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention and entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

As countries seek to develop, their need for access to high technology will become more and more acute. Strenuous efforts will have to be made to balance this need with the need to prevent the proliferation of sensitive technology for weapons purposes. In the coming years, will it be possible to reach a compromise,

with regulatory measures negotiated and applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis?

Although considerable progress has been made with respect to weapons of mass destruction and the steps forward have been outlined in general terms by the international community, much less has been accomplished in the conventional field. Nevertheless, recent events have highlighted the urgency of addressing the problem of excessive accumulations of conventional arms and unrestrained and illegal arms transfers that have resulted in suffering and misery for hundreds of thousands of people, particularly in the developing world.

Openness and transparency in military matters have a great potential for contributing to confidence-building and security among States. Further development of the global Register of Conventional Arms and wider participation in it, as well as the establishment of regional and subregional complementary mechanisms, would exploit this potential.

A new trend is emerging: internal conflicts are becoming more frequent and inter-State conflicts are becoming comparatively rare. The ready availability of small weapons exacerbates situations of religious and ethnic tension, destabilizing States and destroying the very fabric of their societies. It seems likely that, in the years ahead, "micro-disarmament" will grow in prominence, as States intensify their efforts to curb the illicit arms trade, to place more stringent restrictions on or ban altogether certain small arms such as land-mines, and the United Nations continues to assist Governments, at their request, in addressing problems of domestic security and

social and economic development that underlie internal conflict.

The objectives of arms limitation and disarmament pursued at the United Nations cannot be achieved without the political will of Member States and their determined collective effort. It is fundamental, therefore, that, in the search for meaningful measures of arms limitation and disarmament, the legitimate security interests of each State be fully respected. No State can hope to attain security for itself if it entails lowering or undermining the security—real or perceived—of other States; the goal is thus to enhance security through fewer arms.

The United Nations is an instrument that the international community voluntarily devised to deal with issues that affect humanity. The extent to which this tool is used to good effect lies with the Member States. In the field of disarmament, the potential of this unique and universal organization has yet to be fully realized.

Annexes

Annex I

Agreements

Since the beginning of the United Nations, the combined efforts of Governments at global, regional and bilateral levels have led to a body of important agreements, treaties and conventions committing their parties to various arms limitation and disarmament measures. The legal instruments concluded so far are listed below (dates indicate year of conclusion or of opening for signature).

The process of achieving a treaty usually goes through several phases. It often begins with a resolution of the General Assembly, sponsored by a number of Member States, calling upon the Secretary-General to carry out an in-depth *study* of a particular subject. The Secretary-General thereupon appoints a small group of experts to clarify the issues involved, to identify problems and suggest alternative approaches. The process then moves to a wider, *deliberative* stage, clearing the way for a consensus among States that may lead to active *negotiations*. If successful, the negotiations culminate in the *conclusion* of an agreement.

After an agreement has been concluded, it is *signed* by States wishing to indicate their intention to adhere to it; subsequently, it is *ratified* by their respective legislatures and they become *parties*. A treaty *enters into force* after certain conditions set out in it—for example, ratification by a specific number of States—have been met. The agreement is then *implemented*. Here the initial institutional arrangements for such measures as reductions and data exchanges are carried out. This stage involves *monitoring* and the *verification of compliance*.

Problems which arise may be dealt with through *consultation* among parties and, if violations have occurred, the Security Council may be called upon by the parties to undertake measures to *enforce compliance* and to prevent further breaches. Finally, an agreement may be modified, amended, or extended, based on the findings of *periodic reviews* of the operation and implementation of its provisions.

Global multilateral treaties

- The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol) of 1925. *In force.*

- The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (Partial Test-Ban Treaty) of 1963 prohibits all nuclear explosions, military or peaceful, in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. It is a partial measure in that it does not ban underground tests. The General Assembly has repeatedly urged conclusion of a comprehensive treaty banning all tests by all States, including those conducted underground. *In force.*

- The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) of 1967 bans the placing of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Earth orbit, or the stationing of such weapons in outer space or on celestial bodies. It also forbids the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing

of any type of weapon and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies. *In force.*

• The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty) of 1968 aims at the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon countries, at promoting the process of nuclear disarmament and at facilitating access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all parties to the Treaty. *In force.*

• The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-Bed Treaty) of 1971 bans the placement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and facilities for such weapons on or under the sea-bed anywhere outside a 12-mile limit from the coastal line. *In force.*

• The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention) of 1972 bans and eliminates all forms of biological weapons. It is the first international agreement providing for a genuine measure of disarmament, in the sense that it not only prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of biological (bacteriological) agents or toxins and of weapons and means of delivery for such agents for hostile purposes, but also mandates their destruction or conversion to peaceful purposes. *In force.*

• The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques of 1977 prohibits the use of techniques

that would have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects through deliberate manipulation of natural processes and cause such phenomena as earthquakes, tidal waves and changes in climate and in weather patterns. *In force.*

• The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Agreement on Celestial Bodies) of 1979 complements the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. It prohibits, *inter alia*, the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies for military purposes. *In force.*

• The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons) of 1981 restricts or prohibits the use of any weapon which injures by fragments non-detectable in the human body (Protocol I), mines and booby traps (Protocol II) and incendiary weapons (Protocol III). These rules range from a complete ban on the use of such weapons to restrictions on their use in conditions that would cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects. *In force.*

• The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) of 1993. This agreement, which bans an entire category of weapons of mass destruction and provides for the destruction of existing stocks, incorporates a complex, intrusive verification system. *Not yet in force.*

• Additional Protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Protocol IV) of 1995 prohibits the employment of laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or one of their functions, to cause permanent blindness to the naked eye, and the transfer of such weapons. *Not yet in force.*

Regional multilateral treaties

• The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 provides for the demilitarization of Antarctica and is the first treaty to put into practice the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It prohibits in the Antarctic region any type of military activity, including the testing of any kind of weapon, any nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive wastes. *In force.*

• The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) of 1967 creates the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area. It commits parties to the Treaty not to test, produce or acquire nuclear weapons themselves or to permit any other Power to do so or to deploy such weapons in the zone. It was the first arms limitation agreement to provide for verification by an international organization. Two Protocols are integral parts of the Treaty. According to those Protocols, respectively, States outside the region with international responsibility there would undertake to apply the Treaty's provisions to those territories and all nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the Treaty. *In force for each Government individually.*

• The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) of 1985 forbids its parties to manufacture, acquire, possess or control any nuclear explosive device inside or outside the zone. It also prohibits its parties from carrying out nuclear testing and commits them to refrain from and prevent the dumping of nuclear materials at sea anywhere within the zone. Three Protocols are integral parts of the Treaty, by which, respectively, States that are internationally responsible for territories in the zone would undertake to apply provisions of the Treaty to those territories; all nuclear-weapon States would commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any party to the Treaty; all nuclear-weapon States would commit themselves to refrain from the testing of nuclear explosive devices anywhere within the zone. *In force.*

• The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 1990, negotiated between member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), seeks to establish a stable and secure balance of conventional forces at lower levels, to eliminate disparities in forces and the capability to launch a surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations. The Treaty puts equal ceilings and sub-ceilings for the two sides on tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. It also sets up an elaborate system of verification, including data exchange, on-site inspection, challenge inspection and on-site monitoring of the destruction of military equipment to be reduced. *In force.*

• The Treaty on Open Skies of 1992, negotiated between member States of NATO and the WTO,

establishes a regime for the conduct of observation flights by States parties over the territories of other States parties. *Not yet in force.*

• The Non-Aggression Pact among States members of the Economic Community of Central African States of 1994 commits parties to refrain in their mutual relations from the threat or use of force or aggression or from encouraging or supporting acts of hostility or aggression. *Not yet in force.*

• The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) of 1995 commits parties to renounce nuclear explosive devices and to declare, dismantle and destroy any that they possess, prohibits the stationing and testing of such devices, prohibits the dumping of radioactive waste and promotes the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology. Three Protocols are attached to the Treaty, by which, respectively, the nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties and not to test nuclear weapons within the zone, and States outside the zone with international responsibility for territories within it would undertake to apply the Treaty's provisions to those territories. *Not yet in force.*

• The Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty of 1995 commits its parties not to acquire, develop, test, use or allow the stationing of nuclear weapons within the zone and prohibits the dumping of radioactive waste. *Not yet in force.*

Bilateral treaties

Negotiations between the two major nuclear Powers, the former USSR/Russian Federation and the

United States, have produced a number of bilateral agreements, including:

- The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) of 1972 restricts in general the development of sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based ABM systems and specifically limits deployment of ABM systems to two sites with no more than 100 launchers each. By a Protocol of 1974, the deployment of ABM systems is further limited to a single area, with no more than 100 launchers. *In force.*

- The Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1972 (SALT I) established limitations for a five-year period, which could be extended, on the number of launchers of strategic weapons.

- The Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War of 1973, under which the two parties agree to make the removal of the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons an objective of their policies and to make all efforts towards guaranteeing stability and peace. *In force.*

- The Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear-Weapon Tests (Threshold Test-Ban Treaty) of 1974 establishes a nuclear "threshold" by prohibiting underground nuclear-weapon tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. *In force since 1990 following the conclusion of a protocol on verification.*

- The Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty) of 1976 prohibits the carrying out of any individual nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes

having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons, or any group explosion with an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilotons. *In force since 1990 following the conclusion of a protocol on verification.*

- The Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1979 (SALT II) established limits on the number and types of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. *Never entered into force.*

- The Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of 1987 establishes centres in Washington and Moscow to be used for exchanging data and providing notifications as required under certain current agreements, including the INF Treaty (see entry below). *In force.*

- The Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) of 1987 provides for the elimination of all United States and Soviet ground-launched intermediate-range (1,000-5,500 km) and shorter-range (500-1,000 km) missiles, their launchers and all their support equipment. A notable aspect of the Treaty is found in its verification provisions, which include on-site inspection, inspection by challenge, and national technical means of verification (satellite observation). *In force.*

- The Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles of 1988 stipulates 24 hours advance notification of the date, launch area and area of impact of missile launches. *In force.*

- The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty/START I) of 1991 stipulates that each side will be

limited to a ceiling of 1,600 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and their launchers, and heavy bombers—and to 6,000 "accountable" warheads deployed on these systems. The Treaty, which is the first agreement to actually reduce strategic nuclear weapons, will do so by approximately 30 per cent over 7 years under very stringent verification. *In force.*

- The Lisbon Protocol of 1992, signed by the four successor States to the former USSR and by the United States, commits the four States to undertake to make such arrangements among themselves as necessary to implement START I, and Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine undertake to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States in the shortest possible time. *In force.*

- The Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty/START II) of 1993 provides for the elimination of the most destabilizing strategic weapons—heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other multiple-warhead ICBMs and for the reduction of the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both sides by two thirds. Reductions are to be carried out in two phases. *Not yet in force.*

Annex II

Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament*

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming the preamble and articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Welcoming the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Desiring a set of principles and objectives in accordance with which nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be vigorously pursued and progress, achievements and shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process provided for in article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, the enhancement and strengthening of which is welcomed,

Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

The Conference affirms the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty,

*NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2, contained in an annex to the Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)).

and accordingly adopts the following principles and objectives:

Universality

1 Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective.

Non-proliferation

2 The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.

Nuclear disarmament

3 Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith

negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

4 The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below:

a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint;

b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;

c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

5 The conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security is reaffirmed.

6 The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, should be encouraged as a matter of priority, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000 would be welcome.

7 The cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones and the relevant protocols.

Security assurances

8 Noting United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which was adopted unanimously on 11 April 1995, as well as the declarations of the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

Safeguards

9 The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or

other nuclear explosive devices. Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

10 All States parties required by article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have not yet done so should do so without delay.

11 International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated. Decisions adopted by its Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness of Agency safeguards should be supported and implemented and the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities should be increased. Also, States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be urged to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency.

12 New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

13 Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under Agency safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

14 Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II as well as III of the Treaty.

15 Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.

16 In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries particularly into account.

17 Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty.

18 All States should, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including in waste management, and observe standards and guide-

lines in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear materials.

19 Every effort should be made to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the financial and human resources necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources.

20 Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Conference requests that the President of the Conference bring the present decision, the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to the attention of the heads of State or Government of all States and seek their full cooperation on these documents and in the furtherance of the goals of the Treaty.

Annex III

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABM Treaty	Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
CFE Treaty	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
ENMOD	Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
INF	intermediate-range nuclear forces
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty (I and II)
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks/Treaty (I and II)
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

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